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THE 4TH WILLI STEINER MEMORIAL LECTURE
Invincible or Just a Flesh Wound?
The Holy Grail of Scots Law
Abstract: This paper, by Hector MacQueen, assesses the current state of Scots law and
the Scottish legal system, arguing that as a small legal system which cannot be self-
contained it is inevitably in a state of crisis, from which, however, it will not be rescued
by Scotland becoming independent.* Whatever happens after the referendum concerning
Scottish Independence on 18 September 2014, the law is in need of active legislative
reform, possibly codification, while the courts must become more positive in the
attraction of business rather than, as it sometimes seems, seeking to push it away.
Mere defence of the status quo will end in disablement and defeat.
Keywords: constitutional law; legal systems; independence; Scots law; Scotland
*This text is a rewritten and lightly up-dated version of
the Willi Steiner Memorial Lecture given at the 44th
Annual Conference of the in British and Irish Association
of Law Librarians held in Glasgow on 13 June 2013. I
have tried to retain something of the informality of a
lecture presentation. The views expressed herein are
personal and should not be attributed in any way to the
Scottish Law Commission.
SCOTS LAW – THE BLACK KNIGHT
My title refers to the famous “Black Knight” scene in the
film “Monty Python and the Holy Grail” (1975). The
Black Knight (played by John Cleese) stands guard over a
short wooden bridge crossing a very small stream. King
Arthur (played by Graham Chapman), accompanied by
his trusty serf Patsy (Terry Gilliam), witnesses the Black
Knight efficiently seeing off a Green Knight’s attempt to
cross the bridge and decides to recruit him for the
Round Table of knights that the king is trying to put
together. The remainder of the scene is described like
this in Wikipedia:
[T]he Black Knight only stands still, holding his
sword vertically, and makes no response until
Arthur moves to cross the bridge. The Black
Knight moves slightly to block Arthur and declares
“None shall pass”. King Arthur, in a conciliatory
manner, asserts his right to cross and praises the
evident bravery of the Black Knight. Arthur then
again moves to pass and the Black Knight moves
to stand firm and declares again, “None shall
pass”. Reluctantly, King Arthur fights the Black
Knight and, after a short battle, the Knight’s left
arm is severed. Even at this the Knight refuses to
stand aside, insisting “‘Tis but a scratch”, later
insisting that he has “had worse”, and fights on
while holding his sword with his remaining arm.
Next his right arm is cut off, but the knight
still does not concede. As the Knight is literally
disarmed, Arthur assumes the fight is over
and kneels to offer a prayer to God. The Black
Knight interrupts Arthur’s prayer of thanks by
kicking him in the side of the head and accusing
him of cowardice. When Arthur points out the
Black Knight’s injuries, the Knight insists “‘It’s just
a flesh wound!” In response to the continued
kicks and insults, Arthur chops off the Black
Knight’s right leg. At this point, the Knight still
will not admit to defeat, instead he replies by
saying, “Right, I’ll do you for that”, and attempts
to ram his body into Arthur’s, by hopping on
his left leg. Arthur is incredulous at the Black
Knight’s persistence, and angrily asks the Black
Knight if he is going to “bleed on me” to win.
The Black Knight replies by saying, “I’m invin-
cible!” to which Arthur replies “You’re a
loony!” With an air of resignation, Arthur finally
cuts off the left leg as well and sheathes his sword.
With the Black Knight now reduced to a
mere stump of a man, he says, “All right, we’ll call
it a draw.” Arthur then summons Patsy and
“rides” away, using coconuts to simulate the sound
of a horse galloping, leaving the Black Knight’s
limbless torso screaming threats at him (“Running
away, eh? You yellow bastards! Come back here
and take what’s coming to ya! I’ll bite your legs
off!”).1
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I want to suggest that the Black Knight can be seen in
some ways as a metaphor for the present state of Scots
law, or, perhaps, for the way in which some of us think
about Scots law, especially, but not exclusively, in its rela-
tion to English law. I say, not exclusively, because I believe
some of the Black Knights of Scots law think in this way
also about human rights law, the Scottish Government
and the Scottish Parliament, and the United Kingdom
Supreme Court when that body is ruling on the closely
inter-twined matters of human rights and devolved com-
petence and powers. My own view, for what it is worth,
is that the system is in crisis; but that crisis is in some
respects an inevitable feature of a small legal system that
cannot be self-contained. The crisis existed before devo-
lution in 1999; it has if anything intensified since then;
and it will not be solved by the Scottish people voting for
independence on 18 September 2014.
“‘TIS BUTA SCRATCH”
On what basis might it be said that a legal system which
has operated for around a thousand years is in crisis?
After all, its existence is guaranteed by no less than two
of the 25 articles of the 1707 Union between Scotland
and England & Wales,2 while there is no suggestion in the
relevant Treaties that the “ever-closer union” envisaged
for Europe entails the removal of the domestic legal
systems within Member States.3 Moreover, what might
have been thought the most obvious gap in a legal system
in Scotland, the absence of a legislature dedicated exclu-
sively to its maintenance and development, has been sub-
stantially (if not fully) filled in as a result of devolution. In
all other relevant respects, the system continues to func-
tion as it has done for centuries: an autonomous court
structure and legal profession, a distinct structure of edu-
cation, training and qualification in law, and, perhaps most
strikingly of all from a library perspective, a vigorous legal
literature (although this last today admittedly contrasts
sharply with the all but moribund situation which pre-
vailed in Scottish legal publishing for a decade and more
immediately after the Second World War).
The starting (or perhaps scratching) point might
however be said to begin with that guarantee of 1707. It
is not always realised that discussions of, and, indeed,
negotiation towards, voluntary Anglo-Scottish Union had
taken place on numerous occasions since the late thir-
teenth century.4 These usually involved marriages
between heirs of the English and Scottish royal houses
which would in course of time produce a single heir to
both Crowns; which would thereafter be unified. In such
negotiations prior to the ones that led to the 1707
Union, however, the Scots always maintained the separ-
ate-ness of their law and legal system even after such a
unification, with a particular point always being the exclu-
sion of any appeal from Scotland to any court sitting in
England. In the 1707 Union, however, the Scots aban-
doned this traditional negotiating position. In Article
XVIII of the Union Agreement of 1707 we find the idea
that “public right” is henceforth malleable to make it the
same throughout the new United Kingdom, whereas
“private rights” are to be changed only where that is for
the “evident utility of the subjects within Scotland”.5
There was a vital contrast here: change to Scots law was
envisaged, albeit with public law more susceptible to
alteration than private law; indeed, Article XVIII itself
authorized immediate Anglicisation in that “the Laws con-
cerning Regulation of Trade, Customs, and . . . Excises . . .
[was to] be the same in Scotland, from and after the
Union as in England”. Further, while the courts of both
Scotland and England were expressly to retain their separ-
ate jurisdictions under Article XIX, nothing was said
(probably deliberately) to prevent appeals from the
Scottish courts to the House of Lords; and these quickly
became established practice in civil cases, to the extent
indeed that there were more House of Lords appeals
from Scotland than from England by the end of the eight-
eenth century.6 But a parallel appeal in criminal cases did
not establish itself, although rejected decisively only as late
as 1876.7
These provisions for change to Scots law by the legis-
lature sowed the seeds from which grew much legal
development that was not so much actively hostile to the
Scottish legal system as simply by-passed it.8 From the
nineteenth century on legislation sought to deal with
pressing social issues to which traditional legal analysis of
any kind, Scottish or English, seemed quite irrelevant if
not inimical – notably social and welfare law, but also the
taxation which provided the resources with which to
tackle these problems. The rise of the welfare state was
the rise of the British state, not of distinct English and
Scottish ones. Likewise the growth of commerce within
the single market that now existed in the United
Kingdom did not respect and was indeed rather im-
patient with jurisdictional divides, and the Westminster
Parliament responded with measures which, while some-
times recognising Scottish differences, tended to treat
them as peculiarities rather than as affecting the funda-
mentals of unifying schemes.9 Commerce also threw up
new ideas – corporations, insurance, intellectual prop-
erty, consumer protection – which seemed to require
new law altogether; and there also seemed to be little
point in spending time devising distinct legal responses
that would accord with either English or Scottish legal
traditions. But English law and lawyers tended to have the
lead in taking such developing law forward, the inevitable
result of a much larger population and economy south of
the continuing jurisdictional border. Scottish freedom of
manoeuvre thus tended to be pre-empted by decisions
and practice in England.
The rise of the state entailed the rise of public law,
which, it will be recalled, might under the Union
Agreement be changed to make it the same throughout
the United Kingdom. Public law could not be seen as
wholly un-Scottish; for example, local government con-
tinued to be Scottish rather than brought into line with
England or re-created along new British forms,10 while
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the constitutional question of the relationship between
church and state in Scotland would be a fundamental
issue dividing Scottish society throughout the nineteenth
and into the twentieth century.11 The emergence of a
Secretary for Scotland as a UK Government post in 1885
(to become a Secretary of State in 1926) was also
important recognition that the governance of Scotland
could not be completely subsumed within an overall
United Kingdom structure. But other great matters of
state by and large fell to be played out elsewhere than in
Scotland or the Scottish courts, and the big books on the
subject were mostly written and published south of the
border, only rarely considering the Scottish dimension or
indeed the Union of 1707 unless to dismiss it or minim-
ise its significance. Dicey’s characterisation of the Act of
Union as merely another statute which the Westminster
Parliament could amend or repeal in the simple exercise
of its own absolute sovereignty is the best-known
example.12
In the relatively recent past, the process of legal inte-
gration in social and commercial matters has been
renewed by the processes of “Europeanisation” following
the United Kingdom’s accession to what is now the
European Union on 1 January 1973. This affects English
as much as Scots law, and it may give the historically
aware Scots lawyer a certain Schadenfreude to hear the
cries of protest emanating from English lawyers against
European Union proposals for changes to the law. Indeed,
similar cries come from France and Germany. If Scotland
is more muted, it may not be so much the product of
greater Europhilia as of, for once, longer experience of
power to change the law being exercised elsewhere than
within its own jurisdiction.
The domestication of the European Convention on
Human Rights, partly through the Human Rights Act
1998 but more significantly through the Scotland Act
1998, has to some extent brought the agency of change
back to Scotland, inasmuch as the Scottish courts have
been given the power to determine the meaning of
Convention rights for themselves and indeed, at least ini-
tially, embraced the opportunity with enthusiasm, notably
in the early decision which rid the legal system of the
phenomenon of “temporary sheriffs” appointed by the
Law Officer who was also ultimately responsible for
the public prosecution system by which accused persons
were brought before the self-same appointees.13 Some at
least of the judges may also have relished the opportunity
to keep the new Scottish Parliament and Government
under control by means of their requirement to respect
Convention rights.14
Some of the enthusiasm faded, however, as it became
clear, not only that criminal law and procedure, hitherto
one of the main bastions of Scottish legal autonomy, was
subject to review for consistency with Convention rights,
but also that for most purposes, the final say on these
matters lay, not in the High Court of Justiciary as hither-
to, but in either the European Court of Human Rights or,
more concerningly, in Westminster, in the form of the
House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, or, after 1 October 2009, the new UK Supreme
Court. The culmination of this was the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Cadder case, handed down on 26 October
2010,15 that the Scottish legislation which allowed the
prosecution to rely on confessions made by a suspect
without access to legal advice during police interviews
was contrary to that individual’s right to a fair trial under
Article 6 of the ECHR as authoritatively defined by the
European Court on Human Rights in Salduz v Turkey.16
This not only over-ruled the High Court’s view of the
question, but also led instantly to a significant legislative
reform of Scots criminal procedure in the form of
the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and
Appeals) (Scotland) Act, which was put through the
Scottish Parliament in a single day as an emergency
measure on 27 October, receiving the Royal Assent just
two days later.17 Further, a High Court judge, Lord
Carloway, was asked to carry out a general review of
Scottish criminal procedure with two main objectives in
mind: compliance with the ECHR and ensuring a fair
balance between the interests of prosecution and
defence. One of his Lordship’s central recommendations
when he reported in November 2011 was the abolition
of the distinctive requirement of corroboration (the
need in a criminal trial to have two independent evi-
dential sources to establish any fact relevant to a
criminal charge).18 Another Bill implementing this
recommendation is now under consideration in the
Scottish Parliament,19 amidst huge public controversy
which includes the argument of criminal defence
lawyers and some others that one of the law’s most
important safeguards of individual liberty is being swept
away in the interests of legal uniformity rather than sub-
stantive justice.
The Black Knight dismisses the loss of his left arm as
but a scratch, and goes on fighting. The autonomy of
Scots law and the Scottish legal system is certainly less
than it was; but the essentially external factors just dis-
cussed have simply forced upon the players within the
system the need to change approach rather than give up
the game altogether. Many of the same factors impact
upon other legal systems in similar ways. Patched up, and
with some rehabilitative treatment, the Scottish version
can continue to perform in a useful way, even to the
extent of using its limited but none the less still real
autonomy to influence those wielding the power of final
decision-making, whether legislative, executive or judicial.
“IT’S JUSTA FLESH WOUND!”
Things become progressively more difficult for the Black
Knight, however, as one by one his limbs are severed; and
however much he may dismiss each of his losses as just
flesh wounds, the reality is that they eventually deprive
him of any capacity to guard the bridge. Is there any
reason to think that Scots law and the Scottish legal
system are on their way to a parallel fate?
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So far as the law itself is concerned, my concerns are
perhaps primarily those of an academic whose main
areas of interest outside the law’s history lie in private
and commercial law. While the internationalisation that
has taken place in the Scottish law schools over the last
twenty years is to be welcomed, one side-effect seems be
an increasing lack of engagement with Scots private law
on the part of academics and students. Researchers are
discouraged from writing on the subject, and from pub-
lishing in Scottish academic and practitioner journals, on
the basis that by definition such research cannot be of
“international” or “world-class” quality as demanded by
the Research Assessment Exercises of the recent past
and now by their replacement, the Research Excellence
Framework. Academic Scottish private lawyers have
responded by engaging vigorously with comparative law
and European private law, but it cannot be said that there
has been much reciprocal engagement with Scots private
law by those joining Scotland’s law schools from other
jurisdictional backgrounds.20
But the concerns are not simply academic. There are
signs that even practitioners are averse to using or inves-
tigating the Scots law that is their raison d’être. In a
lecture to the Trusts Bar in the Faculty of Advocates
delivered on 24 October 2013, former Lord President
Hamilton described how, in an important appeal on the
liability of company directors in breach of their fiduciary
duties,21 counsel declined prompts from the bench to
argue the case on Scots law enrichment principles, and
focused entirely on the doctrine of “knowing receipt”,
hitherto unheard of in Scotland, but which would have
been the basis for discussion in English law.22 The
problem for counsel, of course, was that the English law,
however unsatisfactory, is at least set out in textbooks
and discussed in cases making it relatively easy to estab-
lish a baseline for argument; whereas there was at the
time no complete text on Scots enrichment law and vir-
tually no case law on its application in the context of
fiduciary duties. No doubt counsel could have carried
out the necessary research and thinking but it would
have taken more time and money than perhaps the
clients would have wished.
In the world of commercial contracts it is common
for Scottish practitioners to advise parties to make the
governing law of the contract English rather than
Scottish. This can be to avoid practical difficulties, as has
been made clear to me by my work on the reform of
Scots contract law for the Scottish Law Commission.
Thus, for example, there has been a widespread view in
the profession that Scots law does not recognise “coun-
terpart execution” – that is, the completion of formal
documents by each of the parties signing a copy (or
copies, as the case may be) and then exchanging these
copies so that each has a copy signed by the others but
there is no single version which all parties have signed.
Today this is a commonplace method of completing
agreements around the world for business parties unable
to meet in person; non-recognition is pretty disastrous
for Scots law, since parties would either be advised to
execute documents under English law or, where this was
not possible because property located in Scotland was
involved in the transaction, use complicated work-
arounds. The Scottish Law Commission’s recommenda-
tion for legislation to deal with the issue has been
accepted by the Scottish Government, and a Bill will
come before the Scottish Parliament in the course of
2014.23 But the Commission’s researches showed that
actually counterpart execution had been accepted in the
Scottish common law before the 1707 Union, before
being lost to sight (apart from an isolated sheriff court
case in 1957) sometime in the later eighteenth century.24
Since the Commission’s investigation began with a simple
search for “execution in counterpart” on Westlaw’s
Scottish library, one cannot but feel that this story too
illustrates the modern Scottish profession’s apparent
unwillingness to investigate in any depth the law in which
it was educated.
My own mission in the Commission is generally to
review contract law and, in particular, seek to rid it of
any rules which, like the supposed non-recognition of
counterpart execution, cause practitioners to switch to
English law as the governing law when Scots law would
otherwise apply, or that might cause others to avoid
Scots law where a choice was either open or being
sought, or that are simply out-of-date and inconsistent
with modern business conditions. One example of the
last at which we have looked is the postal acceptance
rule, established since the nineteenth century in, first,
English, then, a little later, in Scots law. By this rule a
postal acceptance concludes a contract at the moment of
posting, although obviously the offeror knows nothing of
it at that moment. For that reason, professionally advised
offerors commonly require that the other party’s accept-
ance reach them for a contract to be concluded. The
Commission has therefore proposed that the postal rule
be abolished.25 While consultees were generally in agree-
ment with this, there was concern for some at least that
Scotland should not act unilaterally on this subject. It
would seem that there is business benefit for Scots
lawyers in a commercial perception that Scots law is not
so very different from English law, so that any reform
which conspicuously moved away from the English pos-
ition would be a cause for concern, even if it actually
modernised or simplified the law.
Something similar can be found in the courts, in par-
ticular the Commercial Court set up within the Court of
Session in 1994. This has undoubtedly been successful in
attracting business into the Scottish courts which might
readily have gone elsewhere. The commercial judges have
told me that many if not most of the contracts which
they see in their cases are expressly governed by English
law and subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts,
but that no reference is made to this by counsel or the
parties. It is assumed that a choice to litigate in Scotland
has been made because the process is generally cheaper
and mostly quicker than it would be in London, along
5
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with a perception that the outcome is likely to be much
the same on either side of the border. In commercial
cases the law to be applied is indeed often the same
because based on a statute applying throughout the
United Kingdom. But there is also an assumption on
the part of advisers and their clients that the respective
laws of contract are likewise very much the same in sub-
stance. So again any reform that took Scots contract law
to a position visibly different to that existing in England
would not be especially welcome.
A final observation on this commercial setting is the
attitude of the funders and the insurers without whose
support and engagement commercial activity and devel-
opment generally becomes difficult at best and impossible
at worst. While Scotland once provided enough of a
market place for banks and others to run independent
and successful businesses there, survival in the conditions
of the last couple of decades has required expansion far
beyond the Scottish market;26 and by and large this has
led to abandonment of Scots law as the basis for com-
mercial transactions and the adoption, at least within the
United Kingdom, of English law instead. This is what
funders and insurers know and expect to see in the pro-
jects they are supporting: if English law presents difficul-
ties, established solutions are usually available, while the
English courts generally have judges with enough com-
mercial experience to provide robust solutions to new
issues if they arise. This, rather than any perceived defi-
ciency in Scots law as such, is the main reason for non-
use of Scots law; English law is simply better known.
The flesh wounds from which I think Scots law is suf-
fering at present in the commercial context can thus be
summarised as a combination of impotence (the brute
economic facts of a United Kingdom marketplace),
inaccessibility (where is Scots law to be found?); ignor-
ance (partly a concomitant of the inaccessibility); impa-
tience (if an answer can be found in the much more
abundant English sources, why take the time to see
whether the Scottish sources tell a different story?); and,
perhaps, indifference (why does or should it matter
which law applies?). It is more than disconcerting that
those with the power and knowledge to choose their law
and legal system on the whole go elsewhere. When all
this is coupled with the academics’ fear of being thought
parochial or local in one’s concerns if focusing at all on
Scots law, the resultant mix is pretty toxic.
Other symptoms of difficulty extend far beyond the
contract and commercial law, however. The business pro-
blems of solicitors’ firms have manifested themselves
most dramatically in the sudden closures of well-known
names such as Semple Fraser (March 2013) and Ross
Harper Solicitors (May 2012). They may also underlie
defensive inter-Scottish mergers such as those between
Burness of Edinburgh and Glasgow and Paull &
Williamson of Aberdeen late in 2012, and the disappear-
ance of such leading lights as McGrigors (2012) and
Dundas & Wilson (late 2013) within the multi-national
conglomerates of Pinsent Masons and CMS Cameron
McKenna respectively.27 At the foot of the professional
ladder it has also been a hard time for would-be entrants
to the profession since 2008, with training places drying
up, and a lack of newly qualified (NQ) positions and pro-
spects for those who have managed to complete trainee-
ships. Some firms have come through the financial crisis
of the last few years in better shape than others; but
none have been unaffected.
There has likewise been a steady decline in the
amount of civil business in the Scottish courts over the
last four years.28 For a system which places a good deal
of weight on judicial precedent as a source of law, this is
a particularly worrying trend. One has only to look com-
paratively at the neutral citation case numbers in Scotland
and England to see how poorly off we are. The highest
number I could find on the BAILII website for [2012]
EWCA Civ was 1,865, while for [2012] CSIH it was 102.
The highest number for [2012] CSOH was 197, which is
far outstripped by the 4,000 plus in [2012] EWHC. In
other words, for England & Wales BAILII shows a major
Common Law system in operation, while the low
Scottish numbers reinforce a concern well expressed in a
Joint Advice on a possible Common European Sales Law
prepared by the Law Commissions but having a wider
significance:
For a legal system to succeed it needs to develop
a critical mass. It needs to be sufficiently popular
and important for lawyers and judges to study it.
It needs to develop case law to guide its interpret-
ation, and put flesh on the bare bones of the
text.29
Does Scots law itself match up to such requirements?
Other evidence that suggests not can be found in the
Consultation Paper published in November 2011 by the
Review of Expenses and Funding of Civil Litigation in
Scotland. The Review, led by Sheriff Principal James
Taylor, was to consider the affordability of litigation and
“other factors and reasons why parties may not litigate in
Scotland”. Discussing the existence or not of a “compen-
sation culture”, Sheriff Principal Taylor remarked:
[T]he number of claims made with respect to all
liabilities in Scotland and England was considerably
lower in Scotland than would be expected for a
country with one tenth of the population (5.2
million in Scotland compared with 51 million
persons in England). Over a 3 year period in
Scotland (from 2008–11), the total number of
claims for clinical negligence in Scotland was one
thirtieth of all claims made in England (1,194 com-
pared with 29,388), the total number of claims for
employer liability in Scotland was one twelfth of
all claims for employer liability made in England
(17,235 compared with 211,488), the total
number of claims for motor liability in Scotland
was one twenty fourth of all claims made in
6
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England (76,740 compared with 1,904,298), and
the total number of claims for public liability in
Scotland was one fifteenth of all claims made in
England (15,844 compared with 236,801).30
Sheriff Principal Taylor went on to draw a parallel with
the 2001 findings of Hazel Genn and Alan Paterson that
only 26 per cent of the Scottish population reported
experiencing one or more problems or events for which
a legal remedy was available compared to 40 per cent in
England and Wales.31 He expressed agreement with their
suggestion that these figures showed, not a lesser level of
potentially justiciable incidents in Scotland, but rather a
difference in the country’s social structure and culture in
which “prevailing economic conditions, legal institutions
and the availability of alternatives to the civil courts for
dispute resolution” all played their part.32 It may well also
be, however, that the way in which people in Scotland
view courts as a forum for resolving their disputes and
difficulties is not defined only by the perceived expense
of taking legal action. One would not wish to encourage
ambulance chasing by judges as well as practising lawyers,
but something may need to done to make going to court
less off-putting for the ordinary person.
This problem was, however, not one addressed at all
in the Scottish Civil Courts Review led by Lord Gill (now
Lord President), which was published in 2009 and is now
beginning to be implemented by legislation in the Scottish
Parliament.33 The chief concerns of that Review are
evident in the chapter headings of its report: the struc-
ture of the civil courts, a new case management model,
information technology, mediation and other forms of
dispute resolution, facilitating settlement, and enhancing
case management. In other words, it is about how to
handle rather than how to attract business. One could be
forgiven for thinking indeed that the chief aim is to drive
business away from the courts, especially the Court of
Session. Its privative jurisdiction is to be increased from
the current £5,000 to £150,000, with cases whose value
is less to be decided in the sheriff courts (which will
remain largely unreformed, apart from the introduction
of a specialist personal injuries court and a sheriff appeal
court, from which leave to appeal further to the Court
of Session will be required).
This, in the language of the Report, will leave the
Court of Session to deal only with major litigations. But
litigations are classed as major only in terms of their
value, not their possible significance for legal develop-
ment. Under a scheme of this kind, would a modern May
Donoghue get to the Supreme Court with her complaint
about the decomposed remains of a snail in a bottle of
ginger beer?34 She would be lucky, one fancies, to get as
far as Parliament House in Edinburgh. Not only was her
claim not allowable under the authorities up to the date
of bringing her action,35 but the real May’s damages claim
of £500 translates into about £25,000 today applying the
retail prices index, or £77,000 applying an average earn-
ings multiplier,36 i.e. either way, well below the Gill
threshold for first instance actions in the Court of
Session. Yet May’s claim in 1929 led to one of the most
significant legal advances in the Common Law world in
the twentieth century.
None of this is to say that the present civil courts
system is incapable of improvement or greater efficiency.
There are clearly many problems needing to be tackled,
but the Review did not touch upon those which seem to
matter most for the courts as vehicles for the develop-
ment of the law. The late Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, one
of the Scottish Supreme Court Justices and before that a
Lord of Appeal in Ordinary as well as, even earlier, Lord
President of the Court of Session, clearly found that dis-
tance did not lend enchantment to the judicial styles of
his former colleagues on the Scottish bench:
[I]t occurs to me when I read Court of Session
judgments that many judges spend an enormous
amount of time simply recounting the submissions
of the parties. … It does not appear to serve any
very useful purpose. What matters is not for the
judge to tell the parties what counsel argued, but
to tell them what the judge has decided in the
light of the argument.37
His successor as a Scottish Supreme Court Justice, Lord
Reed, has also explained what Lord Rodger taught him
about the writing of judgments:
… the intended reader should be borne in mind.
… [I]t was important to avoid being tedious. … In
a judgment, rehearsal of the arguments ad longam,
in the manner which was then (and largely
remains) the almost universal practice of the
Scottish Bench, was considered a grave fault: not
only tedious but a waste of time, since the reader
would simply skip all that and go to the court’s
own discussion of the issues. Opinions which set
out over many pages the submissions of junior
counsel for the appellant, then junior counsel for
the respondent, then senior counsel for the appel-
lant, followed by senior counsel for the respond-
ent, only to announce a preference for one view
or the other without any substantial analysis of
either position, were a particular bugbear.38
Despite these strictures from above, judicial practice in
the Court of Session has (with honourable exceptions)
remained unchanged and laborious. The justification for it
is the need to show the evidence and an understanding
of the legal argument upon which a decision is based and
render it appeal-proof at least on those kind of grounds;
but this user can testify that his practice as a reader is
indeed as Lord Reed describes it, only going back to the
summary of the arguments if one wonders whether or
how a particular point was made, or to check if some-
thing has been missed by counsel.
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The Scottish Supreme Court Justices have also in
recent times offered severe criticisms of sheriff court pro-
cedures and judgment styles, and the lack of case manage-
ment in the lower courts.39 But I have seen no sign of any
change of approach, at least in the relatively few sheriff
court judgments which make it on to the Scottish courts
website. There is at least some evidence, however, that
more heed is being paid to the Justices’ strongly stated
objections to the present rather lax approach (certainly
by comparison with the rest of the United Kingdom) to
enabling appeals to the Supreme Court from Scotland in
civil matters – certification of reasonableness by two
counsel rather than leave from either the Court of
Session or the Supreme Court itself on the ground that
the case raises an arguable point of law of general public
importance.40 The Scottish Government published a con-
sultation in August 2013 on whether a leave requirement
should be introduced, giving a fairly clear indication that
the answer Yes was expected.41
“I’M INVINCIBLE!”
The one-legged Black Knight can still stand, hop about,
and proclaim himself unconquerable; but this simply
invites his reluctant opponent to complete the job of
rendering him helplessly incapable of any motion at all. Is
there any room for thinking that despite all the “flesh
wounds” just described Scots law and the Scottish legal
system still have more than one leg to stand on; that,
despite all the problems, this is a case for treatment
rather than one awaiting the moment of release or mer-
ciful despatch?
The first thing to say is that people have been pro-
claiming the imminent death of Scots law for at least the
last hundred years. Yet the law and the legal system
which sustains it continue to exist in internationally
meaningful ways. Whatever you may think were the
rights or wrongs of the compassionate release of
Abdelbaset al-Megrahi from a Scottish prison in 2009, for
example, there was nothing that the governments of the
United Kingdom or the United States of America could
lawfully do about a decision made under Scots law by a
Scottish Justice Secretary exercising powers which had in
fact been conferred upon him by legislation passed by the
pre-devolution Westminster Parliament.
The mixed system of Scots private law, combining
the supposedly fundamentally different and incompatible
elements of Civilian and Common Law thinking, has
attracted substantial interest in other jurisdictions:
notably the other mixed systems such as South Africa
and Louisiana, but also in Continental Europe where it
serves as a possible exemplar for a future European
private law.42 Scottish practitioners play an active part in
international (and especially European) legal associations;
Scottish law firms have offices outside Scotland, reflecting
the international nature of their businesses; and where
thirty years ago it was exceptional for Scottish academic
lawyers to travel internationally to talk about Scots law,
today it is rare indeed to find a colleague who is not
either recently returned from doing so or contemplating
an imminent departure on such a mission or, perhaps, a
period of research leave in a foreign law school.
Legislative devolution has done much to invigorate
the legal system; again, whether or not one approves of
all the results. The editors of a collection of essays on
law-making in the first ten years of the Scottish
Parliament note that early optimism has been tempered
by experience, so that while there has been far more
legislation than initially anticipated, much of it has been
ad hoc and reactive rather than bold or principled in
nature. But, they add,
… a number of the contributors also express
admiration for the Parliament’s legislative skill and
respect for its achievements. In particular, as
Robert Rennie’s study of property law, Gavin
Little’s chapter on the reform of the judiciary,
Stuart Cross’s analysis of charities and David
Cabrelli’s discussion of arbitration indicate, there
are important areas where careful technical revi-
sion and well debated, thoughtful legislation have
significantly improved legal provision for Scotland.43
For my own current institution, the Scottish Law
Commission, the existence of the Scottish Parliament and
past success with land law has encouraged ambitious pro-
jects for the comprehensive modernisation of other
significant areas of law such as land registration, trusts,
moveable securities, incapable adults and, of course,
contract. The realistic prospect of legislation also encou-
rages the active participation of stakeholders in the
Commission’s efforts to gain understanding of present
practice and problems as well as to produce principled
yet realistic solutions. The Land Registration etc
(Scotland) Act 2012 is a recent example of what can be
achieved by reform processes of this kind, and others
may follow over the next few years.44
Sometimes, of course, the legislative solutions can
seem to some to be simply bringing Scots law into
line with the position in England. At a recent seminar
in Aberdeen on counterpart execution of documents,
for example, such a criticism was offered of the
Commission’s Report on the subject (although the
speaker also conceded that he thought the present Scots
law on the execution of documents archaic). Criminal
lawyers also often make remarks of the same nature
about Commission reforms on topics such as double
jeopardy and similar fact evidence.45 Yet, as the late Tony
Weir once remarked, “it may be useful to consider how
very different, after nearly three centuries of political uni-
fication in an unquestionably single market, the laws of
Scotland and England continue to be”.46 English lawyers
continue to find whole areas of Scots law – for example,
property, unjustified enrichment, family, succession, and
(still) criminal law – quite foreign, while even in contract
and delict substantial differences remain to puzzle from
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time to time. Scots law is also still capable of innovation.
So a distinctive Scottish public law had begun to emerge
even before devolution,47 and it cannot be assumed any
more that there are no significant differences with English
law in this field despite the Supreme Court’s ultimate
control in relation to devolution issues. The latter are
not the whole of public law in Scotland.48
On contract law, where the parties perhaps uniquely
have a real freedom to choose their law and do not, as
already discussed, tend to plump for the Scottish version,
one can comfort oneself with various further thoughts
also gleaned from the Law Commission review of con-
tract law. Contracts for the transfer of immoveable prop-
erty located in Scotland mostly have to be subject to
Scots law. Scottish local authorities contract only under
Scots law, and are obviously major players in terms of the
economic activity they engender in Scotland. Small busi-
nesses whose markets are limited to the local will prob-
ably find themselves contracting mainly under Scots law if
simply because unaware of any entitlement to choose
another law. Likewise private individuals contracting with
each other, say, in buying and selling a car; but dealing as
a consumer can happen under another law (for example,
the law of Luxembourg if one is contracting with
Amazon), even if he or she can choose to sue the sup-
plier, and can only be sued by that supplier, in a Scottish
court.49 So the Scots law of contract and its application
within the Scottish legal system is certainly still alive.
The Black Knight is finally reduced to a limb-less
stump of a human being who, however, loses nothing of
his defiance and bravado in the face of impossible odds.
“All right,” he cries, “we’ll call it a draw. Come back here
and take what’s coming to ya! I’ll bite your legs off!” He
too is still alive and he still has teeth which can be sunk
into any assailant coming close enough to let that
happen. His problem, however, is that he can simply be
ignored by anyone who wants to do so; and he cannot
join the search for the Holy Grail unless carried there by
others.
THE HOLY GRAIL OF SCOTS LAW
It is more than time to leave the Black Knight and Monty
Python, and move on in conclusion to more scholarly
territory – the British Library website. It tells us:
The search for the [Holy Grail] became the prin-
cipal quest of the knights of King Arthur. It was
believed to be kept in a mysterious castle sur-
rounded by a wasteland and guarded by a custo-
dian called the Fisher King, who suffered from a
wound that would not heal. His recovery and the
renewal of the blighted lands depended upon
the successful completion of the quest. Equally,
the self-realisation of the questing knight was
assured by finding the Grail. The magical proper-
ties attributed to the Holy Grail have been plaus-
ibly traced to the magic vessels of Celtic myth that
satisfied the tastes and needs of all who ate and
drank from them.50
It would be rash indeed for a Scottish Law
Commissioner to think of himself as a questing knight, or
of the Commission as a mysterious castle surrounded by
a waste land – and even more so to cast Scots law and
the Scottish legal system as a Fisher King.51 For my part,
the point of departure is that Scots law and the Scottish
legal system exist, with there being no prospect or
serious fear of their outright abolition or disappearance.
Indeed there is some possibility – not very strong, if the
opinion polls are to be believed, but real nonetheless –
that in the near future their current relative autonomy
will be reinforced by the political independence of the
jurisdiction within which they operate. It thus behoves
the participants in the system – the people who live
under it as well as legislators, judges, lawyers and law
reformers – to make it and the law it operates as good as
can be, matching and where feasible surpassing inter-
national standards of excellence and justice. If the out-
comes attract others to make use of it in some way, that
will be all to the good; but the primary aim must be the
best possible service to the people of Scotland.
In thinking about what this might entail, I often find
myself reflecting on the wise words of those who have
gone before. I agree with the late Lord Cooper, Lord
President of the Court of Session 1947–1954, that the
first concern should be with “the matters which inevit-
ably touch the lives of all citizens from the cradle to the
grave”, i.e. not the criminal law or the control of govern-
ment, but rather “the body of principles and doctrines
which determine personal status and relations, which
regulate the acquisition and enjoyment of property and
its transfer between the living or its transmission from
the dead, which define contractual and other obligations,
and which provide for the enforcement of rights and the
remedying of wrongs”.52 In this lens, since everybody
dies, the law of succession is much more important than,
for instance, the law of corroboration, which affects only
those who investigate and prosecute crime, those
accused of crime, and the victims of crime – important
groups each, but even all together still a small minority of
the population. It is a serious reflection on the social
understanding of those responsible for taking these
things forward to legislation that two Reports on
the subject of succession from the Scottish Law
Commission – one published in 1990, the next in 2009 –
each remains unimplemented despite the major difficul-
ties caused by the present unreformed rules in modern
social conditions.53
Again, take James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, also a
Lord President of the Court of Session, writing towards
the end of the seventeenth century:
No man can be a knowing lawyer in any nation,
who hath not well pondered and digested in his
mind the common law of the world, from whence
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the interpretation, extensions and limitations of all
statutes and customs must be brought.54
By the “common law of the world” Stair meant “material
justice … orderly deduced from self-evident principles,
through all the several private rights thence arising, and
… the expedients of the most polite nations, for ascer-
taining and expeding the rights and interests of
mankind”.55 In other words, he thought that good law
was produced by a mixture of internal reflection on
justice between persons and external comparison with
the answers provided in other legal systems. For Stair,
England was one but by no means the only possible com-
parator. He might also, incidentally, have asked us to con-
sider why Scotland is one of the very few jurisdictions in
the Western world still to have a requirement of corrob-
oration in criminal cases.
In the mid-twentieth century, J J Gow, who learned
his law and taught it in Aberdeen as well as practising and
teaching it in Australia and Canada, said somewhat similar
things to Stair in criticism of the approach of his legal
contemporaries in Scotland:
In this exceedingly complex society of ours what
the lawyer dare not be without is a knowledge of
the economic, political and social facts of his civil-
isation. He needs this knowledge not as a dilet-
tante, not even as a matter of personal cultivation,
important though that may be, but as a matter of
professional competence. … Our society is chan-
ging faster than I write. In so far as it has or will
have room for a legal profession, it is and will be
for a profession which is not excessively con-
cerned with the pathological processes of the law
conducted in a manner which often exhales the
odour of antiquity, but which is prepared to go
out into the social field, ascertain the facts of life,
gauge the needs and aspirations and seek to
furnish efficient answers through the courts and
otherwise. … Society does not owe us a living
and certainly not on the excuse that because a
nineteenth- or earlier-twentieth-century judge said
otherwise we are powerless to act. Nor is the
timidity and evasiveness of politicians a pretext for
doing nothing.56
One specific lesson which I draw from all these observa-
tions is the need, not just to reform the law, but also to
think hard about the need for doing it by way of legisla-
tion or even codification. The difficulty of saying what
Scots law is in many areas of current concern has borne
itself in upon me repeatedly in writing national notes for
Scotland for European private law publications and even
more urgently in making contributions to joint projects
with the Law Commission of England & Wales. Far too
often one is left making extrapolations from nineteenth-
century or earlier cases or drawing upon isolated (and
not infrequently unreported) single judge decisions of
more recent provenance. If the relatively time-rich pro-
fessor or Law Commissioner finds such exercises prob-
lematic, what of the hard-pressed practitioner advising
clients? The difficulties can be exacerbated by the writers
of legal textbooks and treatises taking widely divergent
views of such authorities as exist in the sources. A code
– or quasi-codifying statutes in particular area – would at
least have the merit of stating authoritatively what the
law is, for good or ill. And if it turned out to be ill, it
could then be reformed with better understanding of
what the problems for solution are. That is a solution
not readily available in a Common Law system.
For example, the project on which I am working at
present in the Commission – third party rights in con-
tract – is an area of essentially judge-made law, the pro-
blems with which could conceivably be sorted out by
the courts themselves; but for such judicial adjustment
the right case would have to emerge and its potential
significance be recognised by advisers, pleaders and
judges, while the parties would also have to be ready,
financially and in other aspects, to take it all the way to
the Supreme Court to have a previous decision of the
House of Lords over-turned.57 The chances of all these
things occurring simultaneously in a small legal system
are, however, remote indeed. A small piece of legislation
could, I think, easily put right the particular problem
which makes the present law unfit for modern condi-
tions; but will Parliamentary time be found amongst
so many other competing priorities? In some ways it
could be politically more straightforward to put the
matter on the legislative agenda of the Scottish
Government and the Scottish Parliament as part of a
larger and more ambitious scheme such as a contract or
more general private law code, should such a thing ever
get off the ground.
Such codifications are not, of course, short-term pro-
jects. Unless we were simply to adopt some already codi-
fied system, substantial human and other resources over
a long period of time would be required. But new and re-
codifications are taking place all over the world at the
moment; where the will and the need exist, the means
can be found. But until these things come together, and
indeed in anticipation of these things coming together,
we must do more in the reform of the courts to attract
and retain business, not drive it away, and so improve the
chances of developing our common law. Judges, court
administrators, and court practitioners need to face out-
wards as well as dealing with the specifics of the case
before them in the time-honoured ways.
All of this applies, I think, whether or not Scotland
becomes an independent country after 18 September
2014. Many of the problems I have described are those of
any small legal system in the modern world and its globa-
lised economy. They will not loom any less largely
because the system is that of a small independent state,
whether or not that state is the best of its kind in the
world. Despite the fact that an already distinct law and
legal system has long been one of the primary reasons
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for supposing that Scotland could indeed become
an independent state once more, the subject is not
addressed until the seventh of the ten chapters
altogether in the White Paper produced by the Scottish
Government in November 2013.58 The document there
tells us that an independent Scotland will be a member
state of the European Union and the Council of Europe,
meaning amongst other things that the new written con-
stitution which it also promises will probably bear a close
family resemblance to the European Convention on
Human Rights. There will no longer be an appeal to the
UK Supreme Court, however; it will be replaced by a
court combining the present Inner House of the Court
of Session with the Court of Criminal Appeal.59 But
there is next to nothing in the White Paper about civil or
non-criminal law, and not much more on criminal law
and procedure. If there was ever a thought that a great
project of reforming statutory restatement or codification
of the law could follow independence, it has clearly been
discarded, at least at this stage.
FINALTHOUGHTS…
Speaking as one who has yet to make up his mind on
independence, I believe we must, whatever happens,
consider what is needed, and what we may want,
from a small legal system and its law, especially its
civil law. We must think in particular whether we can
really manage to operate consistently with the rule of
law and human rights as a Common Law system in
the areas covered by the headings of “Private Law”
and, indeed, “Criminal Law”. Too much of our law is
uncertain; and where it is known, it is often too
inflexible and so difficult to apply in modern social
conditions. We have not been bold enough in think-
ing about what modernisation requires, or in trying
to use our traditional sources in less traditional ways
– for example, in thinking what specific statutory
changes might imply for neighbouring parts of judge-
made law.60 If we take Scots law seriously, and want it to
have a good and useful future rather than merely go on
existing because it does, we need to stop being Black
Knights, remind ourselves again and again of what Stair
and Gow said in the passages I quoted above, look
around us, and act in their spirit – not to defend the
status quo or to seek a restoration of the status quo
ante, but rather to respond as well as we can to the eco-
nomic, political and social facts of our civilisation and
make our law fit for consideration as part of the
common law of the world.
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